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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
ARTICLE 3- JURISDICTION AND SERVICE,
APPEARANCE AND CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii): Appellate Division vacillates in construction of
foreseeability requirement of long-arm statute.
Where a nondomiciliary commits a tortious act outside New
York which produces injury to persons or property within the state,
CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) may provide a jurisdictional predicate. 45 The pro-
vision, enacted in 1966, was intended to abrogate the rule of Feathers
v. McLucas,46 which had left a plaintiff, injured under such circum-
stances, without recourse.4 7
the denial of plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint, refused to apply Codling because
"the issue was completely litigated and the appeal process carried to its ultimate dispo-
sition ... " 46 App. Div. 2d at 305, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 264. By so deciding, it avoided the
question of retroactivity.
Finally, one must consider the position of the retailer. In extending warranty liability,
the intent of the Court was to place the burden for the injuries caused by defective
products on the manufacturer, i.e., the one who controls production. See Codling v.
Paglia, 32 NY.2d 330, 339-41, 298 NE2d 622, 626-28, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 467-69; Comment,
The Last Vestige of the Citadel, in Symposium on Products Liability, 2 HoFsrRA L. REv.
721, 726 (1974). In light of this purpose, should the retailer be limited in any cross-claim
against the manufacturer by a contract statute of limitations? The inequity of this situa-
tion is discussed in Siegel, supra note 4, at 69-70. The Appellate Division, Fourth Depart-
ment, in a decision prior to Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288,
331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972), held that a middle-man would not be able to implead the original
manufacturer when the contract statute of limitations had expired. The court cited
Mendel as authority. Ibach v. Grant Donaldson Serv., Inc., 38 App. Div. 2d 39, 45, 326
N.Y.S.2d 720, 725-26 (4th Dep't 1971).
A number of jurisdictions have resolved the question of products liability by legisla-
tion. See 43 FoRDHA2 L. Rev. 322, 328-29 n.53 (1974). A legislative approach has been
considered preferable in light of the potential complications that may be unforeseen in
any single judicial decision. See id. at 328-29.
45 CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) allows for personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciiary if he
commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property
within the state ... if he
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the
state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international com-
merce.
The limitations within subparagraph (ii) of subdivision (a)(3) were inserted, along
with subparagraph (i), to keep CPLR 302 "well within constitutional bounds." Legislative
Reports, N.Y. SEss. LAws [1966], at 2749, 2786 (McKinney) [hereinafter cited as Leg. Re-
ports]. See A. Milner Co. v. Noudar, 24 App. Div. 2d 326, 329, 266 N.Y.S.2d 289, 293 (Ist
Dep't 1966), ("[i]n the enactment of the CPLR the Legislature has not extended New
York's jurisdiction to the utmost constitutional limit'). But see Lewin v. Bock Laundry
Mach. Co., 42 Misc. 2d 599, 601, 249 N.Y.S.2d 49, 51 (Sup. Ct. Kings County), afrd mem.,
22 App. Div. 2d 854, 255 N.Y.S.2d 466 (2d Dep't 1964), aff'd mem., 16 N.Y.2d 1070, 213
N.E.2d 686, 266 N.Y..2d 391 (1965) ("New York has committed itself to a full exploitation
of jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries').
46 15 N.Y.2d 433, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.YS.2d 8 (1965).
47 Prior to amending the CPLR, it was stated:
In the light of the Feathers decision, it is dear that amendment of CPLR 302
(a)(2) is necessary if legal protection is to be accorded to New York residents who
are injured within the state by foreign tort-feasors who cannot be reached through
implementation of the transaction of business clause ....
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The tests prescribed to trigger long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR
302(a)(3)(ii) after an injury within the state has occurred are first, fore-
seeability, and second, the deriving of substantial revenue from either
interstate or international commerce.48 The condition of foreseeability,
as expressed in the statute, requires that the defendant "expects or
should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state."49
This provision has recently been the subject of contTadictory inter-
pretations.
In Tracy v. Paragon Contact Lens Laboratories, Inc.,50 a New
York resident, allegedly injured by the breaking of a contact lens in
her eye, brought a claim in negligence and breach of warranty against
the Louisiana supplier of the lens. Plaintiff, formerly of Tioga County,
New York, had traveled across the New York-Pennsylvania state border
and ordered the lens from a Pennsylvania clinic. The clinic, in turn,
had ordered and received the lens from the Louisiana defendantY1
Leg. Reports, supra note 45, at 2786. The amendment of CPLR 802(a)(2) resulted in the
addition of the current CPLR 802(a)(3). For a discussion of the 1966 amendment and its
effects, see The Quarterly Survey, 41 ST. JoHN's L. REy. 466, 471-73 (1967).
48 CPLR 502(a)(3)(ii). See Leg. Reports, supra note 45 at 2790. In predicating jurisdic-
tion on 302(a)(3)(ii), it should be realized that "the mere occurrence of a tortious injury
in New York still does not suffice as the basis of personal jurisdiction." 7B MVCKNNEY's
CPLR 302, commentary at 87 (1972). A showing of substantial revenue from either inter-
state or international commerce is necessary. However, the commerce in which the
defendant is involved need not be connected with New York. Leg. Reports, supra note 45,
at 2790. See Path Instruments Int'l Corp. v. Asahi Optical Co., 312 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); Gonzales v. Harris Calorific Co., 64 Misc. 2d 287, 315 N.Y.&2d 51 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County), aff'd mem., 35 App. Div. 2d 720, 315 N.YS.2d 815 (2d Dep't 1970). The question
of whether a defendant is deriving substantial revenue from interstate or international
commerce is "one exclusively for the courts," and is not within the jury's province.
7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 302, commentary at 93 (1972). See Shippey v. Berkey, 6 App. Div.
2d 473, 179 N.Y.S.2d 366 (3d Dep't 1958).
Courts may use different approaches in determining if the substantial revenue test
has been satisfied. Such determination could
be construed to require comparison of New York (or interstate or international)
gross sales revenue with a defendant's total gross sales revenue ... or New York,
interstate or international net profits with a defendant's total net profit, but there
are cases which deal with the question of substantiality in terms of dollar volume
of sales or profit in the abstract ....
Gillmore v. JS. Inskip, Inc., 54 Misc. 2d 218, 221, 282 N.Y.S2d 127, 132 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1967) (citations omitted).
An interesting parallel issue concerns discovery. The question may arise whether a
court has jurisdiction to order a defendant to submit to pre-trial disclosure in order to
determine if the defendant is involved in substantial interstate or international business
where the defendant asserts that he is not subject to in personam jurisdiction. In Peterson
v. Spartan Indus., Inc., 33 N.Y.2d 463, 310 N.E.2d 513, 354 N.Y.S.2d 905 (1974), it was
held that a plaintiff, asserting a nonfrivolous claim of jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1),
need not establish prima fade jurisdiction in order to invoke the benefit of 3211(d), which
permits discovery to determine if sufficient facts exist to support jurisdiction. The Peterson
holding might prove useful in actions arising under CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii).
4 9See note 45 supra.
80 44 App. Div. 2d 455, 355 N.YS.2d 650 (3d Dep't 1974).
51 ld. at 456, 355 N.Y.S2d at 651.
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Plaintiff, having had no direct dealings with the Louisiana defendant,
claimed that defendant knew "'that its contact lenses dispensed
through... [the clinic], located on the New York-Pennsylvania border,
would be used by and purchased by residents of... New York.' "52
Rejecting this argument, the Appellate Division, Third Depart-
ment, reversed the order of the trial court and dismissed plaintiff's
complaint, holding that CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) afforded no basis for
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 3 The court felt that neither
the trial court's knowledge of the proximity of the Pennsylvania clinic
to New York nor the fact of such proximity itself was controlling
over whether the defendant could be said to reasonably expect his
act to have consequences in New York.54 In applying what may fairly
be labeled a subjective test, the court refused to impute knowledge of
proximity to the defendant, stating that "it is the defendant's expecta-
tion of forum consequences that controls." 55
The holding in Tracy has been deprived of its vitality in light of
the Third Department's more recent decision in Allen v. Auto Spe-
cialties Manufacturing Co.56 Without specifically overruling Tracy,5 7
the Third Department retreated from its position of two months prior,
stating that "[t]he test of whether a defendant expects or should
52 44 App. Div. 2d at 458, 555 N.YS.2d at 653. Within the Tracy opinion, there is no
mention of how the plaintiff attempted to satisfy the condition of substantial revenue
under CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii). The court accepted the defendant's contention that "approxi-
mately 15% of its business is interstate, primarily in Alabama, Mississippi, and Pennsyl-
vania." Id. at 456, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 651 (footnote omitted). The defendant did no business
in New York. Id. Since the court based its decision on plaintiff's failure to establish the
defendant's reasonable expectation of potential consequences in New York, there was no
finding as to whether the 15% interstate commerce would have satisfied the substantial
revenue condition. See generally note 48 supra.
53 Since the transaction did not occur in New York and the defendant was not doing
business in New York, the court found no other basis for jurisdiction. Accordingly, the
complaint was dismissed. 44 App. Div. 2d at 457, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
54 Id. at 458, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
55 Id. (emphasis in original). The court cited Homburger & Laufer, Expanding Juris-
diction Over Foreign Torts: The 1966 Amendment of New York's Long-Arm Statute, 16
BUFFALO L. Rxv. 67, 74 (1966), wherein it is stated: "The jurisdictional tests set forth
in subparagraph (ii) depend upon the defendant's state of mind, namely his reasonable
expectation of forum consequences." It is interesting to note, however, that within the
same article, the authors stated:
[The courts are experienced in applying as determinants of negligence standards
of comparable breadth such as those of the reasonable man or foreseeability of
harm. If these standards have any relevance, they also indicate that the phrase
"reasonably expects" will be given an objective rather than a subjective meaning.
Id.
56 45 App. Div. 2d 331, 857 N.Y.S.2d 547 (3d Dep't 1974).
57Justice Staley, author of the Allen opinion, cited Tracy for the proposition that
"[a]il that must be found is that 'the presence of defendant's product in New York with
some potential consequences was reasonably foreseeable rather than fortuitous."' Id. at
333, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
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reasonably expect his act to have consequences within the State is an
objective rather than a subjective one."58
In Allen, the Michigan defendant had entered into an agreement
with its New York agents to solicit sales for its automobile specialty
equipment, including truck stands and lifts.5" Plaintiff, an auto me-
chanic employed by a purchaser of defendant's product, was injured
when a stand, used to support a pickup truck under which he was
working, collapsed.60 The court sustained jurisdiction over defendant
on the basis of CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii). Defendant's solicitation of busi-
ness in New York through its agents and employees was held deter-
minative of the foreseeability issue.61
It seems clear that the better approach to construing the foresee-
ability condition of CPLR 802(a)(3)(ii) is to employ an objective test.62
If, instead, a subjective test is utilized, the court must inquire into the
defendant's state of mind63 rather than address itself to the statutory
prescript of whether the defendant should "reasonably expect the act
to have consequences in the state." Under the latter approach, the
58 Id.
59 Id. at 332, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 549. From these facts, no issue was raised by the court
as to whether defendant was transacting business in New York under CPLR 302(a)(1).
CPLR 302(a)(1) states that "a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-
domiciliary ...who in person or through an agent . .. transacts any business within
the state .... In Singer v. Walker, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965),
jurisdiction was found under CPLR 802(a)(1) following an accident in which the plain-
tiff sustained injuries from a defectively manufactured hammer. The defendant was
found to be "transacting business," since it had "shipped substantial quantities of its
products into this State as the result of solicitation here through a local manufacturer's
representative .... Id. at 466, 209 N.E.2d at 81, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
It is possible that CPLR 302(a)(1) covers a nonresident who does not come to New
York himself, but who merely sends goods into the state pursuant to an order sent
from New York. In view of the Court of Appeals' opinion in Singer, there would appear
to be no doubt of jurisdiction if a nonresident had salesmen in New York or solicited
business by means of catalogues and advertisements circulated in the state. Leg. Reports,
supra note 45 at 2785.
The defendant in Allen had received orders from its agent, a sales representative,
who solicited orders in New York. 45 App. Div. 2d at 332, 357 N.Y.&2d at 549. It is
uncertain, therefore, why the court failed to explore the possibility of predicating juris-
diction upon CPLR 302(a)(1).
60 45 App. Div. 2d at 332, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
Gild. at 333, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
62Accord, Brown v. Erie-Lackawanna R.R., 54 Misc. 2d 225, 227, 282 N.Y.S.2d 335,
337 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1967), wherein it was stated: "The test of whether the
defendant expects or should reasonably expect the act [occurring outside the state] to
have consequences in this State is an objective not a subjective (i.e., what is in the mind
of the nonresident) one, and should be so construed .... "
63 Presumably, even under a subjective approach, once a defendant is found to have
knowledge of his product's ultimate destiny, his anticipation of consequences within that
jurisdiction would follow as an inescapable conclusion. 44 App. Div. 2d at 458, 355
N.Y.S.2d at 653.
64 CPLR 302(a)(ii) (emphasis added).
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word "reasonably" would be deprived of all meaning. Moreover,
opting in favor of a subjective test would place a serious obstacle in
the path of a plaintiff who would be required to prove an actual
expectation on the part of the defendant.0
As an ancillary issue in its construction of the foreseeability re-
quirement of 302(a)(3)(ii), the Tracy court considered the weight to be
given to the nature of the article causing injury in New York.66 If the
personal nature of a contact lens requires the seller to foresee that it
will accompany the owner on all his travels, the nature of the goods
would become conclusive on the foreseeability issue. Such a blanket
test of foreseeability, however, was specifically rejected. 67 The unani-
mous court, speaking through Justice Greenblot, cautioned that if the
nature of the article were determinative, "the foreseeable consequences
test would lose all substance, for who can say that it is never foresee-
able ... that a defect in a readily movable item of a personal nature
could have consequences in New York."68
In so holding, the Tracy court has typified the prevailing hesi-
tancy on the part of some courts to support jurisdiction by means of
a liberal standard of foreseeability.6 9 This approach, however, may be
unduly solicitous when one bears in mind that the legislature incor-
porated the substantial revenue test into CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) as an
additional safeguard of constitutionality. 70 A better approach, perhaps,
6 It must be remembered that CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) was intended to insure legal pro-
tection for New York residents who are injured within the state by a nondomiciliary
who cannot otherwise be reached. Leg. Reports, supra note 45, at 2786. Injection of the
defendant's subjective knowledge into the foreseeability test of CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii), places
a greater burden on a plaintiff attempting to utilize this basis of jurisdiction. The fore-
sceability test has been characterized as less than a commodious obstacle in the deter-
mination of jurisdiction.
Dean Joseph M. McLaughlin maintains that the requirement of substantial revenue
under CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) is more reassuring in the maintenance of a reasonable long-arm
statute than that of foreseeability, since "in how many cases can it be said to be unrea-
sonable to foresee that a product will wind up in New York?" 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR
302, commentary at 91 (1972). Cf. Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239
F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956) discussed in note 69 infra.
66 44 App. Div. 2d at 458, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
07 Id.
68 Id.
69 See Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir.
1956), wherein Judge Sobeloff exemplified the unwillingness courts have displayed in al-
lowing jurisdiction to be predicated merely on foreseeability. By means of a hypothesis,
the court acknowledged the ease with which foreseeability for jurisdictional purposes
can be met. The court noted
the hesitancy a California dealer might feel if asked to sell a set of tires to a
tourist with Pennsylvania license plates, knowing that he might be required to
defend in the courts of Pennsylvania a suit . . . for heavy damages in case of
accident attributed to a defect in the tires.
Id.
70See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 302, commentary at 91 (1972). See also note 55 supra.
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would be to treat the personal nature of the article as establishing
prima facie a reasonable expectation of forum consequences once the
defective product is placed in the mainstream of commerce.
CPLR 308(4): Both timely nailing and mailing required to toll statute
of limitations.
Where a natural person is to be served with process but such
service cannot be made upon the defendant personally, CPLR 308
provides for "substituted" means.71 After reasonable attempts have
been made to effect in-hand delivery or mail and delivery service in
accordance with subparagraphs (1) and (2) of CPLR 308, a plaintiff
may resort to "nail and mail" service pursuant to 308(4).72 Two steps
are contemplated by this form of service. First, the summons must be
attached to the door of the defendant's actual place of business, dwell-
ing or usual abode.78 Second, a copy of the summons must be mailed
to the defendant's last known residence. Failure to perform either step
will result in lack of jurisdiction over the defendant. 74
71 CPLR 308 has been deemed to provide for a "hierarchy of alternative means of
service, in which the primary place is given to the delivery of process to the defendant
in person." Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 502, 236 N.E.2d 451, 457, 289 N.Y.S.2d
161, 170 (1968). See generally 1 WK&M J 308.01-.02a.
72 CPLR 308 provides in part:
Personal service upon a natural person shall be made by any of the following
methods:
1. by delivering the summons within the state to the person to be served; or
2. by delivering the summons within the state to a person of suitable age
and discretion at the actual place of business, dwelling place or actual abode
of the person to be served and by mailing the summons to the person to be
served at his last known residence ....
When a plaintiff, using due diligence, has exhausted the possibility of service under the
above subparagraphs, he may then proceed, without court order, to employ the nail and
mail form of service
by affixing the summons to the door of either the actual place of business, dwell-
ing place or usual place of abode within the state of the person to be served
and by mailing the summons to such person at his last known residence ....
Id. 308(4). The affidavit of service, filed with the clerk of the court following the 308(4)
service, must set forth the details, including dates and hours, of the efforts made to
serve the defendant personally, in order to show that the plaintiff has acted with due
diligence. Blatz v. Benschine, 53 Misc. 2d 352, 354-55, 278 N.YS2d 533, 536 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1967) (mem.); Iroquois Gas Corp. v. Collins, 42 Misc. 2d 632, 636, 248
N.Y.S2d 494, 498 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1964), aff'd, 23 App. Div. 2d 823, 258 N.Y.S.2d
376 (4th Dep't 1965) (mem.).
73 The "nailing" obligation requires that the summons be affixed to a place where
the defendant in fact resides or works. While the "mailing" requirement may be satisfied
by mailing to the last known address of the defendant, the service will be vitiated upon
proof that the nailing was to a place where the defendant no longer lives or works.
Polansky v. Paugh, 23 App. Div. 2d 643, 256 N.Y.S.2d 961 (Ist Dep't 1965) (per curiam);
Entwistle v. Stone, 53 Misc. 2d 227, 278 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1967)
(mem.); Todd v. Todd, 51 Misc. 2d 94, 272 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966)
(mem.).
74 See Mittelman v. Mittelman, 45 Misc. 2d 445, 447-48, 257 N.Y.S.2d 86, 88-89 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1965), cited in 7B McKmNEY's CPLR 308, commentary at 209 (1972).
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